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Introduction
In a recent collection of articles on the signiﬁcance of the work by the
American sociologist R.K. Merton, Charles Tilly (2010, p. 55) argued
for mechanism-based explanations of the middle range. In his own
words, ‘mechanistic explanations offer a distinctive, superior grasp
of how social processes actually work’. Tilly’s plea ﬁts in a develop-
ment in which mechanism-based explanations are increasingly gaining
attention. This development is in response to shortcomings in causal
explanations and is also expressive of the conviction that proper expla-
nations should detail the ‘cogs and wheels’ or the ‘nuts and bolts’ of
the causal process through which the outcomes to be explained are
brought about (Elster, 1989; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; Tilly, 2005;
2010). Another important factor is the explicit interest in developing
a theory of action that combines explanations at the macro-level with
explanations at the micro-level (Coleman, 1986; 1990).
In this chapter, we argue that mechanism-based explanations are
highly relevant for the ﬁeld of migration studies (see also Faist, 2015).
We will illustrate this by means of the migration mechanism of ‘cumu-
lative causation’ or ‘circular migration’ as developed by Myrdal and
Massey. However, this mechanism was mostly used to explain the con-
tinuation and expansion of migration ﬂows. In this chapter we focus
on reverse cumulative causation. Reverse cumulative causation relates
to feedback mechanisms that contribute to the discontinuation and
decline of migration ﬂows. A second aim of this chapter is to show the
importance of moving beyond migrant networks to understand how
the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation works. Therefore, we
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analyse how macro-level factors inﬂuence the functioning of Brazilian
and Moroccan migrants and their networks (the macro–micro problem).
We shall explain the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation with
reference to two examples of declining migration: the migration cor-
ridors from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands.
We will draw on qualitative and quantitative THEMIS data collected
for analysing the Brazil–Portugal corridor and the Morocco–Netherlands
corridor (see chapters 6 and 7).
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss the
importance of mechanism-based explanations and introduce the mech-
anism of reverse cumulative causation. After that we analyse the workings
of the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation. We will focus in par-
ticular on the ‘agentic’ role of individual migrants and their networks in
reducing immigration (Paul, 2011, p. 1844; Bakewell et al., 2013). The
chapter concludes with a discussion of the main ﬁndings.
The idea and structure of mechanism-based explanations
In their overview article on causal mechanisms in the social sciences,
Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, pp. 50–52) posit four generally shared
ideas on what characterises a mechanism:
1. A mechanism is identiﬁed by the kind of effect or phenomenon it
produces.
2. A mechanism is a causal notion.
3. A mechanism has a structure: ‘When a mechanism-based explana-
tion opens the black box, it discloses this structure. It turns the black
box into a transparent box and makes visible how the participat-
ing entities and their properties, activities, and relations produce the
effect of interest’ (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p. 51).
4. Mechanisms form a hierarchy: ‘While a mechanism at one level pre-
supposes or takes for granted the existence of certain entities with
characteristic properties and entities, it is expected that there are
lower-level mechanisms that explain them’ (Hedström and Ylikoski,
2010, p. 52).
In elaborating their mechanism-based explanations in sociology,
Hedström and Ylikoski mark out two positions. First they point to the
necessity of systematically integrating theoretical and empirical work,
connecting to Merton’s plea for sociological theories of the middle
range. These are theories that can explain diverse social phenomena
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but that do not pretend to be all encompassing, general theories.1
As an example they refer to Merton’s mechanism of the self-fulﬁlling
prophecy. A typical aspect of how self-fulﬁlling prophecies work is the
feedback mechanism. An incorrect deﬁnition of the situation (the unjust
assumption that a solvent bank is in ﬁnancial trouble) brings forth
certain behaviour (customers pull their money out) which inﬂuences
other people’s beliefs and triggers the same collective behaviour in them
(resulting in a ‘run on the bank’). In this way a ‘self-reinforcing and
belief-centred cycle’ is created and an incorrect situation deﬁnition ends
up becoming true (the bank actually does go bankrupt) (Hedström and
Ylikoski, 2010, p. 62). This mechanism of the self-fulﬁlling prophecy has
been used to explain a range of different types of phenomena (including
ethnic and race relations).
The second position marked out by Hedström and Ylikoski is that
it is the primary task of sociology to explain collective phenomena.
For this, and in line with Coleman (Coleman, 1986; 1990), they state
that it is unsatisfactory to explain macro-phenomena in terms of other
macro-phenomena. Their ‘macro–micro–macro’ model is based on the
assumption that a macro-phenomenon is the (unintended) result of the
actions of a large number of individuals in micro-situations. Here they
note that ‘explanatory understanding is only achieved by recognising
that actions take place in relational structures’ (Hedström and Ylikoski,
2010, p. 59). Figure 10.1 – also known as the ‘Coleman boat’ – visualises
their approach. A relationship is assumed to exist between certain social
facts, social structures or institutions and certain social phenomena.2
Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p. 59) use the term ‘macro-level asso-
ciations’. As noted above, they argue that scientiﬁc explanations that
are restricted to macro-level relations are unsatisfactory, as they do not
specify the causal mechanisms by which macro-properties are related to
each other (cf. Coleman, 1990, pp. 6–7). To explain macro-level associa-
tions, three analytical steps are required: ﬁrst, to identify the ‘situational
mechanism’ by which speciﬁc macro-factors shape and constrain indi-
viduals’ desires, beliefs and motivations (macro-to-micro, arrow 1). The
second step is to establish a relationship between individuals’ desires,
beliefs and motivations and their individual actions. This is known as
the ‘action-formation mechanism’ (micro-to-micro, arrow 2). The third
step is to analyse how individual actions interact and interfere with one
another, leading to intended and unintended macro-outcomes. This is
the ‘transformational mechanism’ (micro-to-macro, arrow 3).
These insights are relevant for the ﬁeld of migration studies. This can
be illustrated by reference to Massey’s theory (1990; Massey et al., 1998)
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Figure 10.1 A typology of social mechanisms (based on Hedström & Ylikoski,
2010)
on cumulative causation. This is one of the most developed theories
in the migration literature, offering an explanation for self-reinforcing
processes of Mexican-US migration and other patterns of interna-
tional migration. It also illustrates the signiﬁcance of mechanism-based
explanations, because of the systematic focus on the inﬂuence of
political-economic and local factors on individual behaviour, house-
holds, migrant networks, community structures and belief formations
(migration cultures and the role of migration aspirations). The mech-
anism of cumulative causation consists of a hierarchy of interrelated
mechanisms. In the study Worlds in Motion, Massey et al. (1998) list
eight ways through which migration acquires a self-perpetuating and
self-reinforcing character.3 A crucial mechanism is the mobilisation of
resources from the social networks in which migrants are embedded
(accumulation of social capital) (Fussell and Massey, 2004, p. 152). Ties
with migrants increase the likelihood of migration, as they reduce the
costs and boost the anticipated beneﬁts of migration. The ﬁrst pioneer-
ing migrants need to ﬁnd their way in the destination country, and
for them the costs are high. They can then help out aspiring and new
migrants with jobs, housing and relevant documents, making it easier
and hence cheaper for them. In the words of Massey (1990, p. 8):
[E]xpanding networks cause the costs of migration to fall and the
probability of migration to rise; these trends feed off one another,
and over time migration spreads out to encompass all segments of a
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society. This feedback occurs because the networks are created by the
act of migration itself.
Massey argues in later work that the accumulation of social capital is
the primary mechanism underlying cumulative causation (Fussell and
Massey, 2004, p. 152). He strongly emphasises the role of migrant
networks as the channel of migration-facilitating feedback.
A second important mechanism is the establishment of a migration
culture. As migration becomes increasingly common in a community,
the values and cultural perceptions of that community evolve in a way
that increases the likelihood of future migration. Migration is increas-
ingly seen as a valuable and habitual ambition (Massey et al., 1998;
Heering et al., 2004). However, Massey et al. (1998, p. 48) also acknowl-
edge ‘limits’ to cumulative causation. They argue that the mechanism
of cumulative causation is especially related to rural contexts, and that
at a certain point the migration process reaches ‘network saturation’, so
that the process of migration loses its dynamic (Massey, 1990; Fussell
and Massey, 2004). Economic developments (labour shortages and ris-
ing local wages) in the sending regions may contribute to the reduction
of the out-movement of migrants and to network saturation.
Massey’s work is compatible with Hedström and Ylikoski’s conceptual
framework. Massey shows (1) how economic factors, migration policy
and local relationships inﬂuence the desires and aspirations of potential
migrants to emigrate (situational mechanism); (2) that these aspira-
tions lead to actual migration behaviour and to mobilising information,
money, housing and jobs, as the resources required for a successful
migration (action-formation mechanism); and (3) that the aggregated
result of these individual actions is the emergence, in both the sending
and receiving country, of a migration-facilitating infrastructure, so that
migration becomes self-sustaining (transformational mechanism).
The mechanism of reverse cumulative causation
The mechanism of cumulative causation provides a valuable framework
to explain various migrant movements within speciﬁc migration cor-
ridors analysed by the THEMIS project. One example is the migration
from Morocco to the Netherlands, due to the recruitment of so-called
guest workers since the mid-1960s and the subsequent arrival of part-
ners and children since the mid-1970s (Lucassen and Lucassen, 2011;
De Haas, 2005; 2007). The number of ﬁrst-generation (foreign-born)
Moroccans in the Netherlands increased from less than 25,000 in 1974 –
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the formal recruitment stop for guest workers following the so-called
oil crisis in those days – to about 168,000 in 2005, mainly due to pro-
cesses of family reuniﬁcation and family formation (migration resulting
from the fact that many second-generation Moroccans still found their
spouses in Morocco). Another example is the migration from Brazil to
Portugal. Although Brazil was always an immigrant receiving country,
migration from Brazil to Portugal started in the late 1970s. From the
1970s to 2010, the number of Brazilians in Portugal increased from only
3,000 to almost 120,000 (Fonseca and McGarrigle, 2014). Immigration
from Brazil to Portugal started as a middle-class phenomenon: young
Brazilians came to Portugal to study due to historical colonial ties and
linguistic and cultural links. Since the mid-1990s, it expanded rapidly
and started to include low-skilled migrants. Padilla (2006) refers to this
shift as the ‘proletarisation’ of migration from Brazil to Portugal. Other
scholars speak of a ‘second wave’ of low-skilled migrants (see also Bógus,
2007; Peixoto and Figueiredo, 2007). In sum, in Portugal as well as in
the Netherlands, economic opportunities, permissive migration policies,
support provided by migrant networks and the existence of migration
cultures in high migration-impacted regions (such as Mantena in Brazil
and Rabat and Nador in Morocco) generated a self-reinforcing process of
increasing migration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the
Netherlands.
However, migrant ﬂows from Morocco to the Netherlands began to
decline in the second half of the 1990s, while migration ﬂows from
Brazil to Portugal started to decline since the recent economic crisis of
2008 (Fonseca et al., this volume, Chapter 6; Snel et al., this volume,
Chapter 7). These contemporary patterns of declining migration are to
our understanding not the result of ‘network saturation’, but they are a
consequence of a mechanism we categorise as ‘reverse cumulative cau-
sation’. This mechanism is already visible in Myrdal’s (1957) original
formulations of cumulative or circular causation, which were reintro-
duced and developed by Massey in his work on international migration.
Myrdal showed in his analysis of world poverty that the dynamics of
cumulative causation may cause upward spirals of increasing wealth but
also downward spirals of increasing poverty. Often, these two processes
are interrelated: the upward spiral of an economy may be an impor-
tant cause of another’s downward spiral (see also Myrdal, 1970; Rigney,
2010).
The theory of cumulative causation describes several mechanisms
that lead to upward spirals of migration, while the concept of reverse
cumulative causation seeks to specify mechanisms leading to down-
ward spirals of migration. However, in both causes feedback loops are
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Figure 10.2 Declining immigration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to
the Netherlands as a result of reverse cumulative causation
at work that contribute to self-amplifying processes of increasing or
decreasing migration. The conceptual model of Hedström and Ylikoski
is helpful for specifying the three social mechanisms that generate
the process of reverse cumulative causation (see Figure 10.2). Firstly,
we assume that three institutional macro-level phenomena (restric-
tive migration regimes, limited job opportunities and anti-immigration
sentiments) negatively inﬂuence the beliefs and motivations of set-
tled migrants to support and stimulate potential migrants to move to
Portugal and the Netherlands (situational mechanism). Secondly, this
negative ‘belief formation’ (Hedström and Swedberg, 1998, p. 23) of
settled migrants regarding migration from Brazil to Portugal and from
Morocco to the Netherlands results in deliberate actions not to assist
potential migrants, or to provide assistance only very selectively (action-
formation mechanism). Thirdly, this migration-undermining feedback
towards prospective migrants in the origin countries leads to changes
in the migration cultures in Brazil and Morocco in which potential
migrants are embedded (transformational mechanism) (De Haas, 2010).
As a result, a much more selectively composed group is capable of
moving to Portugal and the Netherlands, namely the higher skilled,
those who can meet the strict demands of migration policies and those
who are less affected by the anti-immigration attitudes. As a result of
these three mechanisms, a causal process arises that results in a decline
in new migration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the
Netherlands.
The model presented in this chapter has its limitations. The mech-
anisms on which our model focuses operate at the level of migrants
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and their networks. The effects of macro-economic and political fac-
tors in the origin and destination countries are analysed through the
consequences they have on migrants’ beliefs, assessments and actions.
We did not analyse broadcast feedback that operates through imper-
sonal channels, for example information, images and ideas that are
transmitted by communication and mass media (see Bakewell and
Jolivet, in this volume). Besides, we did not study systemically how
Brazilian and Moroccan migration has transformed communities of ori-
gin, for example through investments with remittances. In spite of these
limitations, our model offers a framework for understanding migration-
undermining feedback processes that contribute to declining migration
ﬂows.
Declining immigration ﬂows and reverse cumulative
causation of migration
The Brazil–Portugal corridor and the Morocco–Netherlands corridor
have different characteristics. The destination surveys show that almost
90% of the Moroccan respondents lived for more than 10 years in the
Netherlands, while about 50% of the Brazilians in Portugal have lived
there for less than ﬁve years. Among the Brazilian respondents we found
more young, skilled (especially students) and working people. Further-
more, the Brazil–Portugal corridor is characterised by substantial return
migration. The Moroccan respondents were older, less skilled and half
of them were working. Within the Morocco-Netherlands corridor, there
is limited return migration. The surveys in the origin countries show the
strong transnational connections of Moroccans to Western Europe due
to a long migration tradition, in contrast with Brazil that has a younger
immigration tradition.
The overview in Table 10.1 summarises some characteristics of the two
migration corridors and the transformations that took place in the ‘con-
texts of reception’ in Portugal and the Netherlands in the last decades
(Carling and Jolivet, this volume Chapter 2; Fonseca et al., this volume,
Chapter 6; Snel et al., this volume, Chapter 7). Although we are deal-
ing with different migration corridors, the changes in the contexts of
reception point in the same direction: less receptive migration regimes,
fewer job opportunities and a more hostile climate towards immigrants
(cf. Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Portes, 1995).
Fonseca et al. (this volume, Chapter 6) and Snel et al. (this volume,
Chapter 7) show that these macro-level changes in the contexts of
reception have impact on the assessment of migrants living in Portugal
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Table 10.1 Overview of the characteristics of the Brazil–Portugal and Morocco–
Netherlands corridor and the transformation of the contexts of reception in
Portugal and the Netherlands
Corridor Brazil–Portugal Corridor
Morocco–Netherlands
Migration
corridor
characteristics
Young immigration tradition
(from the 1980s)
First mainly professional
middle class and student
migration, later mainly
low-skilled labour migration
and more recently (after 2011)
higher education students
Old immigration tradition
(from the 1960s)
First low-skilled labour
migration, later mainly
low-skilled family reuniﬁcation
& family formation
Substantial return migration
Semi-strong to weak
transnational networks
Limited return migration
Strong transnational networks
Changes in
macro-level
contexts of
reception in
destination
countries
Migration policy:
From a non-issue (1980s) to
permissive & receptive (1990s
and early 2000s) to more
restrictive (from 2003/2007)
Migration policy:
From receptive (1960s) and
permissive (1980s and 1990s)
to very restrictive (from 2000s)
Job opportunities:
From (high) skilled job
opportunities (1980s) to
(partly irregular) low-skilled
job opportunities (1990s and
2000s) to very limited job
opportunities (from 2008
onwards)
Job opportunities:
From regular low-skilled job
opportunities (1970s) to
irregular job opportunities
(1980s and 1990s) to very
limited job opportunities
(2000s)
Societal reception:
From tolerance (1970s and
1980s) to welcoming (1990s)
to selective discrimination
(2000s)
Societal reception:
From welcome (1970s) to
tolerance (1980s and 1990s) to
discontent and hostility (from
2000s)
and the Netherlands to support prospective migrants in Brazil and
Morocco to move to Western Europe. Snel et al. (Chapter 7) intro-
duce the concept of ‘gate closing’ which relates to migrants refusing
to support co-ethnics to move to the Netherlands, and Fonseca et al.
(Chapter 6) speak of ‘proactively discouraging people from emigrating
to Portugal’.
214 Migration Mechanisms of the Middle Range
In the next section, we examine the impact of the institutional
changes on settled migrants in Portugal and the Netherlands with the
help of the model of Hedström and Ylikoski. First, we analyse the chang-
ing beliefs and motivations of settled migrants to support prospective
migrants. Second, we show that settled migrants predominantly act as
‘gate keepers’ and ‘gate closers’ towards prospective migrants (Böcker,
1994; Paul, 2013). Third, we argue that these migration-undermining
acts affect migration cultures in Brazil and Morocco.
Situational mechanism: Declining motivation for supporting
potential migrants
The qualitative interviews held in both the origin and destination
countries indicate that all three macro-factors are at work and inﬂu-
ence the motivations to support prospective migrants to move to
Europe (Fonseca et al., this volume, Chapter 6; Snel et al., this volume,
Chapter 7; Engbersen et al., 2013). However, the outcomes of regression
analyses show that in the Dutch case the respondents’ unwillingness
to support potential newcomers is mainly related to the stricter migra-
tion policies and the harsh Dutch public climate about immigration and
Muslims (Snel et al., this volume, Chapter 7), whereas in the Portuguese
case, economic opportunities are an important factor behind the critical
stance towards potential migrants in Brazil (Fonseca et al., this volume,
Chapter 6). Table 10.2 indicates that the majority of settled migrants
in Portugal and the Netherlands is not recommending prospective
migrants to move to Europe. There is a strong disbelief in the relevance
of a migration project. Furthermore, a minority of the respondents add
they would only give support in some cases and not in other cases. This
shows the growing selectiveness in the support provided to newcomers.
Table 10.2 Respondents’ inclination to recommend people from
Brazil to move to Portugal (N=400) and from Morocco to the
Netherlands (N=420) (%)
Corridor
Portugal–Brazil
Corridor
Netherlands–Morocco
Yes 20.8 8.5
No 68.2 79.3
In some cases, but
not in others
11.0 12.2
Source: THEMIS Destination country survey of Brazilians in Portugal and
Moroccans in the Netherlands (unweighted data).
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In the literature one can ﬁnd abundant evidence of how settled
migrants do not accurately portray life in the receiving society (Mahler,
1995). Even though they have often obtained positions in the lower
strata of the receiving society, they send positive images to the origin
country of wealth they have gained, sometimes even increasing their
debts in order to do so. While we have indications that this was cer-
tainly true for Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands in the past, this
has changed today (Lucassen and Lucassen, 2011). Many respondents
explicitly mention that economic opportunities are not as attractive
as they used to be. Settled Brazilian migrants in Portugal point to the
limited economic opportunities for Brazilian newcomers in Portugal.
Isabella tells us:
I never seen on the Internet, for instance on social media sites, any
Brazilian saying Portugal is wonderful, having many job opportu-
nities ( . . . ) actually quite the opposite, most of people do say it is
difﬁcult to ﬁnd work in Portugal, even before the crisis. It is been
always like that since I started working with migration.
(Isabella, female, 51, Brazil–Portugal, migrant)
Moroccan migrants in the Netherlands express the same negative view
on the current job opportunities. Ilham says: ‘There is no work here.
If they come to Holland they will only get into trouble. In the past
there was enough work, but not anymore’ (Ilham, female, 82, Morocco–
Netherlands, migrant). Other settled migrants also mention that chang-
ing economic circumstances in the Netherlands are making life more
difﬁcult and less attractive for Moroccan immigrants. Souhaila, who
spent nearly 40 years in the Netherlands, mentions: ‘There is no money
to make here. There are no jobs anymore. It’s better to stay over there’
(Souhaila, female, 64, Morocco–Netherlands).
Apart from the limited job opportunities, many settled migrants men-
tion that it has become very difﬁcult for Brazilians and Moroccans
to migrate to Portugal and the Netherlands due to the selective and
restrictive migration policies. Fatima, a 33-year-old Moroccan, elabo-
rates: ‘Today it is difﬁcult to obtain a visa. Also for the request you
must have a job and a large income. The immigration policies are
also stricter than before. Migrants have to do a lot of tests and have
to learn a lot about Dutch culture’ (Fatima, female, 33, Morocco–
Netherlands). In the case of Brazilians in Portugal, they do not have
to pass a language and civic integration test in order to marry a partner
in Portugal. Moreover, if they have a Portuguese grandparent, they can
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easily obtain Portuguese citizenship. Nevertheless, anti-irregular migra-
tion policies have become more restrictive and there are no amnesty
programmes nowadays that make regularisation possible. These stricter
policies reduce the job opportunities and life chances of irregular
Brazilian migrants substantially (Engbersen and Broeders, 2009):
And if I brought someone, employment is difﬁcult, to obtain a visa is
difﬁcult, nobody gives employment like that. I hire people in the
nursing home where I work, they have to be documented, why?
Because if the inspection knocks on the door, I’m the ﬁrst to go to
jail because I admitted someone who is illegal ( . . . ).
(Gisele, female, 45, Brazil–Portugal, migrant)
For those living here [in Portugal], those already with documents, it
is difﬁcult; for someone coming without documents it is even worse!
(Oscar, male, 39, Brazil–Portugal, migrant)
Brazilian and Moroccan migrants furthermore feel that the societal
reception in Portugal and the Netherlands has changed and that immi-
grants are now treated with prejudice. Many Moroccan respondents
elaborated on their actual negative experiences with native Dutch peo-
ple and how bad such experiences make them feel. El Ghazi tells us:
‘Eighty percent are racists. One day I entered a café in Rotterdam to sup-
port the Dutch soccer team and they didn’t want me to enter. Things
like that upset me’ (male, 27, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant). Hassan,
a 41-year-old skilled worker, says: ‘Sometimes you get the feeling that
people hate you. They hate you for who you are and they hate your pres-
ence’ (male, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant). Like El Ghazi and Hassan,
respondents indicate that the attitudes of Dutch people towards them
have changed over the years, especially with respect to their Islamic
religion (see Snel et al., this volume, Chapter 7).
In Portugal, other mechanisms of discrimination are at work. Many
Brazilians – especially women – often feel discriminated against (see
Fonseca et al. in this volume). According to Malheiros (2007), dis-
criminatory attitudes towards Brazilian immigrants are becoming more
frequent. Brazilian women became the main victims of stereotypes that
tend to ‘exoticise’ their image, often seeing them as ‘exotic and easy’.
The discrimination is also felt in the labour market. The high unemploy-
ment rates among nationals and immigrants increase the competition
for jobs and elevate social tensions between these groups. However, the
changes in the societal reception of Brazilians are related not only to the
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economic crisis but also to the rapid and signiﬁcant growth of the size of
the Brazilian community in Portugal, the features of the so-called second
wave that arrived in Portugal in the late 1990s (poor and low skilled),
their incorporation in the secondary segment of the labour market and
to speciﬁc episodes of violent crime which involved Brazilian nationals
(Malheiros, 2007).
The growing competition in the labour market and the discrimina-
tory attitudes of Portuguese employers can be found in Bernardo’s words
who migrated to Portugal in 1990. He reveals how important Brazilian
professionals (e.g., dentists, media and communication experts) were to
train and teach Portuguese professionals and how things changed over
time:
They were well considered. Nowadays they want to see the back of
us ( . . . ) I never felt prejudice. If there was prejudice, I didn’t under-
stand. Nowadays, I already feel a bit ( . . . ) in my area I feel [prejudice]
because “he is taking my place here”.
(male, 57, migrant)
The negative assessments of Brazilian and Moroccan migrants in
Portugal and the Netherlands on migration polices, job opportunities
and societal reception contribute to a growing disbelief in the relevance
and possibility of migration. This disbelief leads to acts of gate keeping
and gate closing among settled migrants in Brazil and Portugal. These
outcomes relate to the action-formation mechanism.
The action-formation mechanism: Gate keeping and gate
closing
The results of the destination surveys show that more than 54% of the
Brazilian respondents do not encourage anyone to come to Portugal,
and that nearly 42% have actually discouraged someone from migrating.
The Dutch data are more signiﬁcant. They show that almost 86% of the
Moroccan respondents do not encourage migration and that more than
39% is actively discouraging further migration (see Table 10.3).
The qualitative interviews give insight into the process of discourage-
ment. First, settled migrants give prospective migrants realistic infor-
mation regarding the worsening economic climate in Portugal and the
Netherlands and the scarcity of decent jobs compared to the past. Sec-
ond, migrants try to explain to prospective migrants in Brazil and
Morocco that it is complicated to get into Portugal and the Netherlands,
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Table 10.3 Encouragement and discouragement of migration from
settled Brazilian migrants in Portugal and settled Moroccan
migrants in the Netherlands (%)
Yes No
Brazilians in Portugal
Encouraging migration (N=400) 45.8 54.3
Discouraging migration (N=400) 41.8 58.3
Moroccans in Rotterdam
Encouraging migration (N=418) 14.1 85.9
Discouraging migration (N=416) 39.2 60.8
Source: THEMIS destination country survey of Brazilians in Portugal and
Moroccans in the Netherlands (unweighted data).
due to the increasing restrictions on immigration. Besides providing
information on the unfavourable economic climate and migration
policies, they also tell potential migrants about the negative social cli-
mate towards immigrants. This ﬁnal aspect is very relevant for the
Netherlands in which anti-immigration and anti-Muslim sentiments
became very clear.
They [family and friends in Morocco] always ask for help to come
to the Netherlands. I always say the same: that it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd
work and that there is high unemployment ( . . . ). If they say that
they want to come to the Netherlands and ask if I can help them,
then I always say that times have changed and that getting work as
an illegal resident is extremely difﬁcult ( . . . ) I tell people not to come
to the Netherlands because in reality it is tough. I try not to sketch a
nice picture of the Netherlands.
(Insaf, female, 45, Morocco–Netherlands)
The situation has changed dramatically. How are you going to ﬁnd
decent work without the right papers? Marriage also comes with a lot
of hurdles. Your spouse has to have a fairly high and stable income,
you need to take exams in your home country and when you get here
there’s another exam you need to take within a year ( . . . .) I would
advise them not to migrate to Europe. I would tell them to stay where
they are.
(Hassan, male, 41, Morocco–Netherlands)
I really like this country in many respects, but there is one thing that
I think is very dangerous: the fact that politicians like Geert Wilders
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are becoming very popular. For Muslims this means that their rights
to practice their religion are in danger. I think a lot of European coun-
tries – including the Netherlands – are very afraid of Islam, and they
are trying to keep this religion outside their borders ( . . . .) Muslims are
not welcome anymore. That is why I would be cautious with giving
Moroccans the advice to come here.
(Tarik, male, 33, Morocco–Netherlands)
Among the Brazilian migrants interviewed in Portugal, the feeling is
quite similar. Especially, the lack of jobs plays a major role among set-
tled Brazilian migrants in Portugal to justify the negative advice given
to potential Brazilian migrants:
Considering the current crisis the country, I would not advise
[Brazilians to come to Portugal]. Due to the unemployment here, to
give opportunity to the people already here. In my opinion, they
should stay in their country ( . . . ) because there’s so much unem-
ployment here ( . . . ) if a job comes up, those living here have more
opportunities. If they come, then things get even more complicated,
I think.
(Joana, female, 42, Brazil–Portugal)
I tell them ‘no use thinking about came here!’ I even had a niece who
was thinking of going to Spain now, because her mother’s boyfriend
lives in Spain. But I told her: ‘Don’t come, it’s not worth coming!’
That’s what I tell them!
(Joaquim, male, 37, Brazil–Portugal)
These qualitative ﬁndings are supported by the results of the desti-
nation surveys among Brazilians in Portugal and Moroccans in the
Netherlands. The Brazilian and Moroccan respondents were asked about
their intentions to support prospective migrants in ﬁve areas, namely
(1) obtaining migration documents, such as a visa or residence per-
mit, (2) covering travel costs, (3) ﬁnding a job, (4) ﬁnding housing and
(5) accommodating someone at home. They were also asked whether
they received support from others during their migration to Portugal
and the Netherlands in four areas: (1) ﬁnancing travel costs, (2) obtain-
ing migration papers, (3) ﬁnding a ﬁrst job and (4) their initial housing
in the Netherlands. The results indicate that, today, nearly 52% of the
Brazilian and almost 70% of the Moroccan respondents have no inten-
tions of offering support, although 77% of the Brazilian and 85% of
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Table 10.4 The intention to give assistance today and received assistance during
one’s own migration (%)
Settled Brazilians in
Portugal (N=400)
Settled Moroccans in the
Netherlands (N=420)
Intention Received Intention Received
None 57.7 5.0 69.0 3.6
1 domain 8.5 22.0 10.7 11.0
2 domains 13.0 36.3 11.0 46.0
3 domains 13.0 31.5 3.6 34.8
4 domains 11.0 5.3 3.3 4.8
5 domains 2.8 – 2.4 –
Source: THEMIS destination country survey of Brazilians in Portugal and Moroccans in the
Netherlands (unweighted data).
the Moroccan respondents received support in two or more areas during
their migration to Europe (see Table 10.4).
However, the quantitative and qualitative analyses also reveal that a
certain group continues to function as selective ‘gate keepers’, yet only
under speciﬁc conditions (Carling and Jolivet, in this volume). Three
important conditions are possession of regular residence documents,
being highly skilled in order to have job opportunities and study pur-
poses. For individuals that meet these criteria migration may still be
worthwhile. This is especially true for contemporary students, who are
an important constituent of the Brazil–Portugal corridor (Carling and
Jolivet, this volume, Chapter 2; Fonseca et al., this volume, Chapter 7).
The transformational mechanism: Migration cultures in
transition
The third mechanism involves the aggregation of migration-
undermining feedback by individuals, which leads to changes in migra-
tion aspirations and cultures. Our qualitative analysis reveals that there
are indications that this transformation is indeed taking place in Brazil
and Morocco. First, we notice a general decline in the aspirations to
leave Brazil and Morocco. This decline is related to improved eco-
nomic conditions in the sending regions (especially in Brazil) but is
also the result of the failed migration project of Brazilian and Moroccan
migrants and the migration-undermining feedback they receive from
return migrants and family members who live in Portugal and the
Netherlands. A common observation among especially the Brazilian
respondents is that they don’t see people leaving the country anymore,
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but rather earlier migrants returning to Brazil: ‘Now, my brother is
coming back, he also gave up. He is returning due to the economic
crisis which affected Portugal a lot’ (Milton, male, 35, Brazil–Portugal,
family member). ‘The number of people who return is increasing. Peo-
ple are coming back, they are not going so much now, because it is
not worth anymore, to go to Portugal now’ (Ema, female, 42, Brazil–
Portugal, return migrant). ‘Now, I see people returning because there is
no more work (in Europe). It is very difﬁcult, things are expensive, food
is expensive, everything is expensive, ( . . . ) it’s difﬁcult. Thus, I think
that the only trend is not to emigrate anymore’ (Amanda, female, 25,
Brazil–Portugal, return migrant).
The majority of the respondents we interviewed in Brazil and Morocco
consider it unwise to migrate to Portugal or the Netherlands today (or
to Europe in general). Their negative perceptions are inﬂuenced by the
migration-undermining feedback received from settled migrants. This
feedback inﬂuences migration aspirations in Brazil and Morocco. There
is less interest in migration to Portugal and the Netherlands and to other
parts of Europe:
The only means through which I know about Holland is from what
my cousins tell me. My cousins also told me how they were victims
of ethnic proﬁling. If people there know that you are a Muslim or
an Arab they automatically label you as dangerous at best, and as a
terrorist at worst. My cousins were victims of this stereotyping. So are
veiled women, who are also viewed with suspicion.
(Lahcen, male, 27, Morocco–Netherlands, family member)
I know that the economic situation in the Netherlands is not that
good. Even my cousin who has been in the Netherlands for quite
some time said that it is more and more difﬁcult to ﬁnd a job. He has
not even saved up any money to invest in projects here in Morocco.
If my cousin who has been in the Netherlands for a long time did
not make it, how could a newcomer like me ever achieve something
there?
(Miro, male, 26, Morcco–Netherlands, family member)
She does not advise people to go anymore because it’s not the same
as it was in the beginning. When she went, it was easier to get a job.
(Heloísa, female, 59, Brazil–Portugal, family member)
I am always talking with my friends who live there [in Portugal] ( . . . )
and I hear them saying that things tighten a lot.
(Marina, female, 39, Brazil–Portugal, return migrant)
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Our respondents in Brazil and Morocco also mention the increasing
opportunities and prosperity in Brazil and Morocco, in contrast to the
declining economic and legal opportunities in Europe:
Migrants used to come with large of sums of money and help oth-
ers, for example to buy houses, land, and so forth. Now people from
Nador see for themselves that migrants have become very mean and
unwilling to spend more money in Morocco. Now when migrants
come to my restaurant, they congratulate me for having decided to
go back to Morocco for good.
(Aziz, male, 55, Morocco–Netherlands,
return migrant)
Nowadays, with regard not only to Portugal but to almost all
European countries, some of them are saved [from this crisis] but
people are retuning more, isn’t it? Because people who are here [in
Brazil] have nothing to earn in Portugal, Spain, because of this ﬁnan-
cial crisis ( . . . ) it affected some countries in particular. Portugal was
one of them, Spain also, Italy is now one of them, France is now one
of them, do you understand? With this [crisis] people who are there
begin to live with difﬁculties.
(Milton, female, 35, Brazil–Portugal,
family member)
The migration-undermining feedback by settled migrants and return
migrants together with changes in the economic conditions in Portugal
and Morocco contributes to changes in migration cultures. The migra-
tion discourse in Morocco has become less widespread, according to the
19-year-old housewife Soumi who lives in Tawrirt and whose father and
uncle left for the Netherlands in the early 1980s.
At the beginning of 2001, everyone talked about migration. Every
day I heard about someone from my family or neighbours who had
migrated. But people are no longer interested in migration, only a
few youths dream of going abroad, especially to Spain or France. They
dream of making a lot of money, owning beautiful cars, houses and
getting married. The obstacle that stops them is that it is so compli-
cated to get the ofﬁcial documents in order to leave Morocco. The
others do not think about migration any more, since they hear about
a lot of people who went abroad and came back to Morocco after
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a failed experience. There are no more jobs available, so then they
found themselves without the money they borrowed to migrate, and
without work in Europe. Most emigrants travelled 10 years ago. These
were the golden years of emigration.
(family member)
The changed migration aspirations and preferences are also observed
in the accounts of the Brazilian and Moroccan migrants. When they
go on a holiday to Brazil or Morocco or when they speak to friends or
relatives on the phone, they are not asked about their migration experi-
ences or possible assistance as much as in the past. Hassan, a 41-year-old
Moroccan, responds:
Of course, I know a lot of people, and it always comes up one way
or the other. How’s life in Holland, how’s life in exile, as they call it?
But almost every one of them assures me that they have no interest
in migrating to Europe. There is nothing left to do in Europe, they
say. The mentality has changed. People ﬁnd something to do and
put their thoughts of migration to rest. Years ago everybody was talk-
ing about leaving the country. ( . . . ) The young people nowadays ask
about Europe out of general interest, but not to actually live there.
( . . . ) You used to hear talk of migration all the time, all the time
young people scheming in the street, telling each other their plans or
giving each other tips on the easiest way to leave the country. Now
when you meet someone you have a casual conversation and a cof-
fee together and then they are on their way again, going about their
business.
(male, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant)
According to Davi, living in Portugal since 1990, who goes on holidays
to Brazil almost every year:
There are many Brazilians leaving Portugal to return to Brazil, because
nowadays Brazil is a much more developed country ( . . . ) Brazil is a
country with lots of potential, thus I think that tradition [of emigrat-
ing] is a bit weaker. It’s not worth leaving when you are in a country
with lots of potential and Brazil is one of the countries growing faster
and I believe the reverse is happening in Portugal. Thus so many
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migrants, not only Brazilians, are returning to their home countries
or choosing other countries for living.
(male, 47)
The more critical stance towards migration to Europe does not imply
that migration is no longer an option. The surveys in the origin
countries show that a substantial number of respondents still have the
aspiration to migrate (see Table 10.5). More than 50% of the Moroccan
population has migration aspirations. The migration aspirations in
Brazil are substantially lower, especially in the urban area of Campinas
where economic conditions have improved substantially in the last
decade (Carling, in this volume).
However, for those who aspire to migrate, the preferred destina-
tions are changing. For Brazilians who aspire to migrate, the United
States is on top of the list because of the economic opportunities
(see Table 10.6). European countries, including Portugal, have become
less popular among the Brazilian population. By contrast, European
countries are still preferred destination countries for the Moroccan
population due to extensive transnational connections (especially in
relation to family and student migration). Germany is mentioned rel-
atively frequently, even though the Moroccan diaspora there is much
smaller than in France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands or Belgium. How-
ever, Germany is attractive because of the economic opportunities that
it offers.
We also note an interest among Moroccan respondents in moving to
countries like the United States and Canada (see Table 10.5). For highly
skilled Moroccans (including students), the United States and Canada
are becoming more popular because of the economic opportunities and
also the presumed tolerant social climate there:
Table 10.5 Proportion of Moroccans and Brazilian respondents who would
migrate to another country if they had the opportunity (%)
Moroccans (N=401) Brazilians (N=425)
Yes, go abroad 52.1 32.2
No, stay in Morocco/Brazil 46.9 67.5
Don’t know/missing 0.9 0.2
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: THEMIS origin country survey: Brazil and Morocco.
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Well, not so many people want to travel to Holland and as I told
you nowadays the most favourite destination for most Moroccans is
Canada because it is an open and tolerant country, unlike Europe
where the economic situation and the xenophobia are making life
very hard for migrants.
(Jamal, male, 49, Morocco–Netherlands, migrant)
Yes, people, especially students, are still interested in going to coun-
tries like Canada, the United States or France. ( . . . ) I think that more
and more students are migrating abroad. Immigration relating to edu-
cation is on the rise. This brain drain is becoming more important
than migration for economic reasons.
(Zahra, female, 52, Morocco–Netherlands,
family member)
In sum, migration cultures in the areas of Campinas and Mantena in
Brazil and the Rabat and Nador areas in Morocco are in a process
of change. There seems to be less interest in migration to Portugal
and the Netherlands. This is partly due to the critical feedback from
Table 10.6 Preferred country of destination (ﬁrst
preference) of Brazilians and Moroccans who would
migrate to another country if they had the
opportunity (%)
Brazilians (N=138)
United States of America 40.6
Italy 13.8
Portugal 10.1
Germany 6.5
Other EU countries 18.8
Other non-EU countries 9.4
Don’t know 0.7
Moroccans (N=213)
France 19.7
Germany 19.7
Belgium 13.1
Netherlands 12.2
Spain 7.0
Other EU countries 8.9
Canada and USA 9.0
Other non-EU countries 6.1
Don’t know/missing 4.2
Source: THEMIS origin country survey: Brazil and Morocco.
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family members who have settled in Portugal and the Netherlands or
from migrants who have returned. Furthermore, people are also less
interested in migration because the opportunities in Brazil (especially
in Campinas) and in Morocco (especially in the Rabat region) have
improved.
Conclusion and discussion
This chapter has argued that mechanism-based explanations are rele-
vant for the ﬁeld of migration studies. This has been elaborated further
with reference to the mechanism of reverse cumulative causation. First,
we postulated that institutional changes at the macro-level (migration
policies, labour market opportunities and societal reception) have conse-
quences for the motivations of individual migrants to offer support. The
more restrictive Portuguese and Dutch migration policies, the declining
job opportunities and the hostile societal reception of immigrants have
reduced the motivation of settled migrants to assist potential migrants.
These changes have also induced strategies of gate keeping and gate
closing (migration-undermining feedback).
We further demonstrated that the critical feedback provided by settled
and return migrants to potential migrants induces changes in migra-
tion aspirations and migration cultures. The three institutional changes
have, of course, a direct effect on the decline in migration from Brazil to
Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands. However, it is the com-
bination of direct effects and the indirect effects that run via migrant
networks that partly explain the decrease in migration. Other rele-
vant factors are the migration-undermining information prospective
migrants receive through impersonal channels (broadcast feedback) or
changing economic opportunities in the origin countries.
Our ﬁndings furthermore indicate that for a smaller group of people,
migration from Brazil to Portugal and from Morocco to the Netherlands
may still be worthwhile. These are higher skilled migrants and migrants
who migrate in a legal manner such as through marriage, for education
purposes or through special programmes for the highly skilled. We may
hypothesise that some of these categories – especially the higher skilled –
have a more individualistic lifestyle and are often staying temporarily
in the destination country. For these reasons they are less inclined and
less able to give prospective migrants genuine assistance for moving to
Europe. This will further reinforce the mechanism of reverse cumulative
causation.
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Reverse cumulative causation is a ‘mechanism of the middle range’
(Tilly, 2010) that can be used to explain speciﬁc patterns within spe-
ciﬁc migration corridors. It remains important, however, to examine
the contextual factors involved in each migration corridor. Thus, there
is an increasing amount of migration from Brazil and Ukraine to the
Netherlands, while both migrant groups would seem to be affected
by the same macro-conditions in the Netherlands as Moroccans. One
explanation for this growth could be that both groups occupy spe-
ciﬁc niches in the urban and rural labour markets. For Brazilians,
this is mostly domestic work in the Amsterdam labour market, while
Ukrainians mostly work in horticulture in the areas around the cities
of Rotterdam and The Hague. The Brazilian migrants exhibit the social
mechanism, described by Tilly (2005), of ‘opportunity hoarding’: jobs
in the domestic work sector are divided among Brazilian migrants (the
‘in-group’), while shutting out other migrant groups (the ‘out-group’)
(see also Faist et al., 2015). As a result, they are able to guarantee speciﬁc
jobs for newcomers from Brazil.
It is furthermore easy for these two groups to evade the restrictive
migration policy: Brazilian citizens are generally allowed to enter the
Netherlands (or any other Schengen area) without having applied for a
visa (Roggeveen and Van Meeteren, 2013), while Ukrainians can travel
to the Netherlands fairly easily via Poland (that became member of the
European Union in 2004). Brazilians are moreover treated positively by
the native Dutch population. In other words, macro-level factors in the
Netherlands work out differently for different migrant groups. These
provisional explanations require a closer study of the Brazil–Netherlands
and Ukraine–Netherlands corridors, for which we can use the macro–
micro–macro model presented in this chapter. The mechanism of reverse
cumulative causation can also be used to explain other declining migra-
tion ﬂows, for instance the declining migration from Turkey to Western
Europe.
Notes
1. Tilly writes (2010, p. 56):
Mechanism-process accounts reject covering-law regularities for large
structures such as international systems and for vast sequences such as
democratization. Instead they lend themselves to ‘local theory’ in which
the explanatory mechanisms and processes operate quite broadly, but com-
bine locally as a function of initial conditions and adjacent processes to
produce distinctive trajectories and outcomes.
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2. Coleman’s well-known example based on Max Weber is the relationship
or Wahlverwandtschaft between religious values of Protestantism and the
economic organisation of a society (capitalism) (see Coleman, 1986, pp. 1321–
1323; 1990, pp. 6–10).
3. Massey et al. (2009, pp. 46–48) mention the expansion of migrant networks,
the distribution of income, the distribution of land, the organisation of agri-
culture, cultural factors, the regional distribution of human capital, the social
meaning of work and the economic structure of production.
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